[−]apical_dendrite · 2026-11-15 Sun 02:23 UTC ·
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The decision to ignore the Morton Thiokol recommendation not to launch wasn't made at NASA HQ. There was a late night teleconference between Morton Thiokol, Marshall Space Flight Center (where the SRB program was managed) and personnel from Marshall and Morton Thiokol on the ground in Florida. The Marshall leadership put a lot of pressure on Morton Thiokol execs to withdraw their recommendation, and Morton Thiokol caved. My recollection is that it's unclear how much if anything was communicated to NASA HQ. These were the people who had taken over after von Braun's retirement, so very much from an engineering rather than a political background.
I don't think that the "teacher in space" part was much of a factor in Marshall's decision-making. There was clearly plan-continuation bias, and there was a clear directive that Marshall should not be responsible for delaying a launch. The management style they had inherited from von Braun also meant that disagreement was highly discouraged. The data was ambiguous enough that they could convince themselves that everything was fine and Morton Thiokol was coming up with a new launch requirement at the last minute.
The person at Morton Thiokol who caved was neither qualified nor authorized to make the decision. The Morton Thiokol engineers said no, and their executives backed them up, but NASA administrators kept asking Morton Thiokol employees that were out of the loop, until they could pressure on into saying yes.
There's a really well written and researched book on the topic, that I highly recommend, called Truth, Lies, and O-Rings by Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, and Jonathan Yen
I don't think that the "teacher in space" part was much of a factor in Marshall's decision-making. There was clearly plan-continuation bias, and there was a clear directive that Marshall should not be responsible for delaying a launch. The management style they had inherited from von Braun also meant that disagreement was highly discouraged. The data was ambiguous enough that they could convince themselves that everything was fine and Morton Thiokol was coming up with a new launch requirement at the last minute.
There's a really well written and researched book on the topic, that I highly recommend, called Truth, Lies, and O-Rings by Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, and Jonathan Yen