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Comment by charcircuit | original | Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel
[−]charcircuit · 2026-08-30 Sun 09:41 UTC · link
Another example for why system() is so dangerous to use.

I also don't understand why it needs to show the dialog in dom0. If you have the option to handle attacker controlled input on the unprivileged side, you should do that instead of putting a lot of logic on the privileged side.

[−]HackerThemAll · 2026-08-30 Sun 10:11 UTC · link
> why it needs to show the dialog in dom0

I think it's the "secure screen" that cannot be manipulated by the malware in a VM. I'd expect a password entry dialog to also be handled like that.

[−]charcircuit · 2026-08-30 Sun 10:38 UTC · link
It's for an the "File copy/move error" error dialog.
[−]danielheath · 2026-08-30 Sun 12:26 UTC · link
If you're going to put the graphics and NIC into separate VMs, surely the secure screen can be another of those semi-privileged VMs rather than part of dom0
[−]delamon · 2026-08-30 Sun 10:13 UTC · link
The code is sloppy. They check existance of kdialog binary using full path; next step they rely on PATH search by shell. If would've been much safer to just do execve directly.